Japan and India Build a Defense Network Around China

TOKYO – Japan is strengthening defense ties with India and Australia because it no longer wants its security to depend on Washington alone. The United States remains Japan’s treaty ally, but wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have raised questions about American weapons stockpiles, production capacity, and ability to respond across several crises at once.

Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s visits to India and Australia show how Tokyo is responding. Japan is adding partners, sharing military technology, and building supply chains that could keep operating even if American support is delayed or limited. The result is a growing Indo-Pacific defense network that Beijing is watching closely.

Japan Looks Beyond Its Traditional US Dependence

Koizumi’s Regional Defense Mission

Koizumi’s trip to India and Australia has a clear focus: expand defense cooperation, strengthen military-industrial ties, and create more reliable supply chains.

India and Japan are expected to discuss defense equipment cooperation, including the UNICORN naval communication system, expanded military exercises, and security conditions across the Indo-Pacific. China is likely to be central to those conversations because both Tokyo and New Delhi face growing pressure from China’s military expansion and more assertive regional activity.

In Australia, Japan is pursuing closer industrial cooperation around Canberra’s planned purchase of Mogami-class frigates. The deal links Japanese shipbuilding with Australia’s naval modernization and gives Tokyo another way to connect defense production with a regional partner.

Japan’s new strategy: Keep the US alliance while building enough defense partnerships across the Indo-Pacific to avoid total dependence on Washington.

This approach doesn’t mean Japan is abandoning the United States. Instead, Tokyo is preparing for a future in which America may not always have enough weapons, ammunition, or military capacity to support every ally at the same time.

Why Japan Is Rethinking Its Security Assumptions

For decades, Japan’s security planning rested on one powerful assumption: the United States would be available if Japan faced a serious crisis.

That assumption still shapes the alliance, but recent wars have exposed its limits. The conflict in Ukraine has consumed artillery ammunition, air defense missiles, drones, and other military supplies at a rapid pace. Fighting in the Middle East has placed additional demands on American weapons production, logistics, and military deployments.

The concern in Tokyo is not that the United States has stopped being capable. The concern is that American resources may be stretched across several theaters at once.

Japan’s worries include:

• Washington may not have enough weapons ready for every conflict.
• American ammunition stockpiles can fall faster than factories replace them.
• US forces may have limited bandwidth if crises erupt in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific at the same time.

Japan also faces its own immediate security concerns. Chinese vessels and aircraft operate more frequently around Japan, especially near disputed areas in the East China Sea. Tokyo cannot assume that an American response will always arrive quickly or at the scale Japan expects.

As a result, Japan is reviewing the link between national security and industrial capacity. A country needs more than military agreements. It also needs factories, spare parts, communications equipment, fuel, ammunition, and transport networks that can keep working during a prolonged crisis.

Defense Diversification Is Japan’s New Strategy

Building More Partners Without Replacing America

Japan’s answer is defense industrial diversification. The idea is straightforward: preserve the US alliance, while adding more partners that can contribute technology, production, logistics, and military capacity.

Tokyo wants to reduce the risk of relying on one country for critical defense equipment. That doesn’t require Japan to sever ties with Washington or create a separate military bloc. It requires Japan to build relationships that give it more options.

India is especially useful in this strategy because it isn’t a formal US ally. New Delhi follows a policy of strategic autonomy, which allows it to cooperate with the United States, Japan, Australia, Russia, and other countries without placing itself fully inside one alliance structure.

That flexibility makes India an attractive partner for Japan. New Delhi has its own defense priorities, a large military, a major domestic market, and a stated interest in expanding local defense production. Cooperation with India can therefore support Japanese security goals while also connecting Tokyo with India’s industrial ambitions.

Japan is not abandoning America. It is reducing its dependence on America.

The Supply Chain Problem

Military supply chains can become security problems when they depend on a small number of countries or factories. A war can increase demand for weapons and spare parts almost overnight. If production cannot keep pace, even a well-equipped military may face shortages.

The same risk applies to naval communication systems, engines, sensors, drones, missiles, and other components. Governments need to know who makes these items, where the raw materials come from, and whether partners can continue production during a crisis.

Japan is also concerned about China’s influence over important commercial supply chains. Chinese export controls have sharpened Tokyo’s worries about whether certain materials and components could become unavailable during a confrontation.

Koizumi has called for consideration of a “China-free” defense equipment supply chain. That phrase describes an effort to reduce exposure to Chinese pressure, rather than a plan to remove China from every part of the global economy.

Japan’s concern is not only who will fight alongside it, but also who can keep producing and supplying military equipment during a crisis.

India and Australia can help address that concern in different ways. India brings manufacturing scale and a large domestic market. Australia brings advanced military capabilities, close links with the United States, and access to the wider Pacific security network.

Why India Is Becoming a Key Partner for Japan

India’s Strategic Autonomy

India’s independent foreign policy is one of its main advantages as a Japanese defense partner.

New Delhi works with Washington through forums such as the Quad, but it doesn’t operate as a US treaty ally. India maintains its own relationships and makes decisions according to its national interests. That gives it room to cooperate with Japan without turning the relationship into a formal alliance.

For Tokyo, this matters because Japan is trying to build a wider network rather than reproduce the same dependence it has had with Washington. India can take part in defense projects while keeping its own strategic choices.

Geography also makes India important. The country sits beside the Indian Ocean’s major shipping routes and shares a long Himalayan frontier with China. Its navy operates in waters that connect the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the western Pacific.

Japan’s security concerns begin in the East China Sea, but they don’t end there. A stronger relationship with India gives Tokyo a partner that is positioned farther west and has direct interests in the Indian Ocean.

India’s Defense-Industrial Potential

Japan and India bring different strengths to the relationship.

Japan has advanced engineering capabilities, naval technology, and experience developing sophisticated military systems. India has a large defense market, a growing manufacturing base, and a political push to produce more equipment at home.

That combination could move the relationship beyond traditional arms sales. Instead of Japan only selling equipment to India, the two countries could develop systems together, produce components in both countries, and create long-term support arrangements.

The early example is the UNICORN naval communication project. The two countries’ cooperation on that system gives their defense industries a practical project to manage together. It also creates experience with technical standards, testing, production, and integration aboard naval vessels.

India could move from being a defense buyer to becoming a defense partner.

That shift would matter for both sides. Japan would gain another production and technology partner. India would gain access to Japanese systems while increasing its role in the development and manufacture of military equipment.

UNICORN Is an Early Test of Defense Technology Cooperation

What the UNICORN System Does

UNICORN refers to a unified complex radio antenna system designed for naval use. The system supports communications on warships and has been associated with Japan’s Mogami-class frigates.

The technology matters because naval communications need to work across crowded and contested environments. Warships must exchange information with other ships, aircraft, command centers, and units operating at different distances. Antennas and communication systems also need to fit within the ship’s design and limit unwanted detection.

India and Japan are working together to develop UNICORN for Indian Navy warships. Reporting on the agreement describes it as the first bilateral project between the two countries to jointly develop defense equipment. More detail on the project is available in this report on India-Japan UNICORN cooperation.

The project is small compared with a fighter aircraft or a frigate, but its importance goes beyond one antenna system. Joint development forces two defense industries to solve real technical and administrative problems together.

Why Co-Development Opens More Doors

A successful joint project can make later cooperation easier. The countries gain experience with:

1. Agreeing on technical requirements and military standards.
2. Sharing information between defense companies and government agencies.
3. Testing and integrating equipment on operational platforms.
4. Supporting the system after it enters service.

That experience can lead to discussions about other naval systems, sensors, communications equipment, unmanned platforms, or production partnerships.

The UNICORN project also fits Japan’s wider aim of building defense supply chains with trusted partners. If India helps produce, maintain, or integrate the system, the technology is no longer tied to a single country’s production line.

Japan’s F-2 Fighters Point to Greater Interoperability

A New Step in Bilateral Exercises

Japan is planning to send its F-2 fighter jets to India for a bilateral exercise. The deployment would be significant because the aircraft hasn’t previously been sent to India for such an exercise, according to reported details about the planned F-2 deployment.

Japan and India have already held fighter exercises. Sending the F-2 would add a new level of operational contact and give both air forces more experience working with each other’s procedures.

Military exercises are useful because they expose practical differences that formal agreements can overlook. Pilots and support crews must work with different communication methods, flight procedures, maintenance requirements, and command structures. Repeated exercises help reduce those gaps.

From Exercises to Military Interoperability

Interoperability means that two militaries can communicate and coordinate effectively during joint operations. It includes more than flying aircraft together. Units need to share information, understand each other’s procedures, and operate safely in the same battlespace.

For India and Japan, that could eventually involve:

• Air combat training and communication procedures.
• Naval coordination between ships and aircraft.
• Shared approaches to logistics and maintenance.
• Technical links between defense systems.
• Planning for operations during a regional crisis.

The F-2 exercise and UNICORN cooperation address different parts of the same problem. One improves operational familiarity. The other creates a connection between defense industries and naval platforms.

Together, these efforts show a relationship moving beyond symbolic visits. India and Japan are building habits that could support more complex cooperation later.

Australia Adds a Second Link to Japan’s Defense Network

Japan’s Defense-Industrial Cooperation With Canberra

Japan’s engagement with Australia gives its strategy a wider regional shape. Canberra is considering the acquisition of Mogami-class frigates, connecting Japanese shipbuilding with Australia’s plans to expand and modernize its navy.

The proposed arrangement involves a major naval purchase and could bring long-term cooperation in construction, maintenance, training, and support. The CSIS analysis of the Mogami and Australia-Japan defense cooperation explains how the frigate program could strengthen ties between the two countries.

Australia is also a close US ally, so this relationship connects Japan’s independent defense partnerships to the existing American security system. Japan can work with Australia on equipment and operations while keeping the United States involved through its established alliances.

The geography is important:

• Japan is positioned near the East China Sea and the western Pacific.
• Australia links the network to the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
• India adds reach across the Indian Ocean and along the Himalayan frontier.
• The United States remains Japan’s main treaty ally and a major regional military power.

This is why the initiative isn’t an India-only project. Japan is building a connected network across several parts of the Indo-Pacific.

A Network, Not an Asian NATO

Tokyo isn’t creating an “Asian NATO.” Japan’s plan also isn’t a replacement for the United States.

The emerging structure is more flexible:

The network can include defense production, naval exercises, communications systems, supply chain planning, and logistics. Each country can decide how far it wants to cooperate in a particular area.

That flexibility may be one of its strengths. India doesn’t need to become a formal US ally, Australia doesn’t need to copy Japan’s defense policy, and Japan doesn’t need to weaken its treaty relationship with Washington.

Why China Is Concerned

The Geography of the New Defense Web

China faces a group of countries that are increasingly connected by military exercises, technology projects, and shared concerns about regional security.

Japan is close to China’s maritime approaches in the East China Sea. India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean and faces China along the Himalayan frontier. Australia provides access to the South Pacific and maintains close defense links with the United States.

The countries are discussing warships, drones, military communications, supply chains, and operational coordination. Each project may appear limited on its own, but together they create more options for regional governments.

China’s growing military power is the common concern. Beijing has expanded its naval and air capabilities while increasing activity in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and western Pacific. Japan sees these activities as a direct challenge to its security.

China Is Japan’s Greatest Strategic Challenge

Japan’s National Security Strategy describes China as its “greatest strategic challenge.” The IISS analysis of Japan’s national security documents explains how Tokyo’s assessment of China has shaped its newer defense planning.

That language doesn’t mean Japan is preparing to start a conflict. It shows that Tokyo sees China’s military growth and regional behavior as the main long-term issue its defense policy must address.

Japan’s response includes stronger national defense capabilities, closer cooperation with the United States, and more ties with partners such as India and Australia. The purpose is to improve deterrence and make Japan less vulnerable if a crisis disrupts normal trade or military support.

Why a Network of Middle Powers Matters

Japan, India, and Australia are capable middle powers with different resources and strategic positions. They don’t need to form one formal alliance to support each other.

They can cooperate through defense production, joint exercises, logistics arrangements, and shared technology. Those links can make it harder for China to pressure one country without considering the reaction of the others.

The network gives Japan, India, and Australia more options without requiring them to form a single formal alliance.

For Beijing, that creates a more complicated regional picture. China’s military planners would have to account for Japanese forces near the East China Sea, Indian naval activity in the Indian Ocean, Australian capabilities in the South Pacific, and the possibility of greater coordination among all three.

The US Alliance Still Matters, but Certainty Has Weakened

Political Uncertainty in Washington

Japan’s concern is not limited to weapons inventories. Political uncertainty in Washington has also raised questions about how consistently the United States could respond to a crisis involving an ally.

US policy can change after elections. Congress can influence funding and arms production. Meanwhile, American forces may have to manage several demands at once. These pressures make it harder for allies to treat US support as automatic in every situation.

Japan isn’t saying the American alliance is ending. It is preparing for uncertainty within that alliance.

Japan’s Two-Part Answer

Tokyo’s approach has two parts:

1. Maintain the treaty alliance with the United States.
2. Build enough additional partnerships to avoid complete dependence on Washington.

This strategy gives Japan more flexibility if US assistance is delayed, limited, or focused on another conflict. It also encourages Japan to expand its own defense production and stockpiles.

The same logic explains why Japan is working with both India and Australia. Australia strengthens ties with an established US ally. India adds an independent power with a large market and growing industrial ambitions.

Together, those relationships reduce the pressure on Japan to rely on one partner for every defense requirement.

What This Means for India

A Chance to Become a Defense Partner

The shift creates a significant opening for India. Japan needs partners that can support production and technology cooperation. India wants to expand domestic defense manufacturing and reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers.

The two countries therefore have interests that fit together:

• Japan brings advanced defense technology and naval expertise.
• India brings scale, manufacturing capacity, and a large defense market.
• Japan gains another partner outside its traditional US-centered structure.
• India gains a chance to participate in development and production rather than only purchasing finished equipment.

UNICORN is an early test of that model. If the project moves forward successfully, it can show that Indian and Japanese companies and defense agencies can work together on complex naval equipment.

Moving Beyond Defense Purchases

A defense buyer imports equipment and operates it. A defense partner can help design, build, maintain, and improve that equipment.

India’s long-term goal is to increase local production and develop a stronger domestic defense industry. Cooperation with Japan could support that effort through joint production, technology partnerships, and shared maintenance arrangements.

Potential areas of future cooperation include:

• Additional naval communication and sensor systems.
• More air and naval exercises.
• Joint production of selected defense equipment.
• Shared supply chains for components and maintenance.
• Greater coordination between Indian and Japanese forces.

These outcomes aren’t guaranteed, and the partnership will face practical limits. Different military standards, procurement systems, budgets, and export rules can slow projects. Still, the direction is clear: the relationship is moving toward industrial and operational cooperation.

India’s Place in the Indo-Pacific Defense Ecosystem

India brings more than manufacturing potential. Its location gives the wider network a strong Indian Ocean presence. It also gives Japan another major partner with direct concerns about China’s military activity and regional influence.

Australia adds advanced military capabilities and a strong US alliance. Japan contributes technology, naval expertise, and a position near the East China Sea. India adds scale, strategic autonomy, and access to the Indian Ocean.

What could develop next includes:

• More defense technology cooperation.
• More frequent air and naval exercises.
• Stronger links between military supply chains.
• Possible joint production projects.
• Better communication and operational coordination.

This is a gradual process, not an established military bloc. Its effect will depend on whether the countries turn agreements and exercises into dependable production and support arrangements.

The Indo-Pacific Is Moving Toward Multiple Partnerships

Japan once built its security planning mainly around the United States. Washington remains central, but Tokyo is now adding India and Australia to create a wider set of relationships.

That change matters because military power depends on more than the number of ships, aircraft, or missiles a country owns. It also depends on whether partners can communicate, replace equipment, share technology, and maintain supplies during a prolonged crisis.

India is becoming important because it can help Japan address both the military and industrial sides of that problem. Australia adds another regional link, while the United States continues to provide the main alliance structure.

China may now face a more connected Indo-Pacific, with Japan near the East China Sea, India in the Indian Ocean and along the Himalayan frontier, and Australia extending the network into the South Pacific. The arrangement doesn’t create an Asian NATO, but it can make the region harder to pressure one country at a time.

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