Gulf of Thailand’s Vast Gas Reserves: A 25-Year Dispute Between Thailand and Cambodia

BANGKOK – Cambodia and Thailand may be sitting on an estimated $300 billion in offshore oil and natural gas, yet much of it remains undeveloped because the two countries still disagree over their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Thailand.

Estimates vary, with sources citing roughly 11 to 12 trillion cubic feet of resources and between 300 million and 700 million barrels of oil, but these figures describe potential reserves, not proven resources ready for production. To accurately assess these deposits, scientists must carefully account for this state of matter trapped under intense subterranean pressure to understand the true commercial potential of the seabed.

The dispute centers on the 26,000-square-kilometer Overlapping Claims Area, or OCA, where competing maritime claims have blocked exploration and raised concerns about energy security, government revenue, and regional stability. As tensions over energy resources in overlapping maritime zones continue, this article examines the dispute’s history, the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, the latest 2026 legal steps under UNCLOS, and what a negotiated settlement or continued deadlock could mean next.

Key Takeaways

• Untapped Energy Potential: The Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand contains estimated reserves of 11 to 12 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and hundreds of millions of barrels of oil, though these remain unproven and require further exploration to determine commercial viability.
• Legal and Political Deadlock: A 25-year territorial and maritime boundary dispute has prevented energy development, as neither Cambodia nor Thailand can unilaterally authorize exploration without risking legal challenges or political backlash.
• Shift in Negotiation Frameworks: Following Thailand’s formal cancellation of the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU 44) in May 2026, Cambodia has initiated a compulsory conciliation process under UNCLOS to seek a path forward through international mediation.
• Path to Development: Future access to these resources likely requires a joint development agreement that allows for energy extraction without forcing either nation to formally concede its sovereignty claims.

Why the Gulf of Thailand’s Gas Reserves Remain Untapped

The Gulf of Thailand may hold major energy resources, but geological potential alone cannot bring gas to market. Before companies can drill, Cambodia and Thailand must settle who can authorize exploration, how revenues would be divided, and which maritime boundary applies. Rising political friction has also affected broader cooperation, as shown by the Thailand-Cambodia diplomatic breakdown.

What the Overlapping Claims Area means

The Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) is a section of the Gulf of Thailand where Cambodia and Thailand claim maritime rights over the same waters and seabed. The disputed zone is commonly estimated at 26,000 square kilometers, although some reports use figures closer to 27,000 square kilometers.

Those competing claims create a legal barrier to drilling. An offshore company needs clear permission before it can survey the seabed, drill an exploration well, install production equipment, and sell any gas it finds. If both governments claim authority over the same block, a company risks legal challenges, political retaliation, or losing its investment after a change in policy.

The problem is similar to two homeowners claiming the same strip of land. Even if a contractor finds valuable minerals beneath it, work cannot begin until the ownership dispute and operating rules are settled. In the OCA, the suspected oil and gas lies beneath the seabed, but access remains tied to unresolved national claims above it.

A maritime boundary determines which country has rights over offshore waters, the seabed, and resources such as gas and oil. Island sovereignty is a different question. It concerns which country owns a particular island and controls its territory, government, and land-based jurisdiction.

That distinction matters because the OCA is separate from the question of who owns Ko Kut, the island known as Koh Kood in Thailand. Arguments over the island can influence public opinion and negotiations, but they do not automatically decide the entire maritime boundary or settle every part of the OCA.

Until Cambodia and Thailand agree on a boundary or create a joint development system, companies face uncertainty over permits, taxation, production rights, and revenue sharing. The resources can remain underground even when the economic case for exploration appears strong.

How much oil and gas could be there?

Public estimates commonly place the OCA’s potential at a volume of around 11 to 12 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and roughly 300 million to 700 million barrels of oil. These figures explain why the dispute attracts attention, but they should not be confused with proven reserves ready for production. Reports on the potential $300 billion gas field describe a large opportunity, not a confirmed inventory.

The estimates come from geological studies, nearby fields, seismic data, and interpretations of the region’s rock formations. Geologists often use the ideal gas law to estimate the amount of gas particles trapped in high-temperature underground reservoirs. While a real gas behaves differently than an ideal one under extreme density conditions, these scientific models help provide the raw estimates that serve as the primary motivator for both nations to seek a resolution regarding this natural gas.

Only exploration wells can show whether hydrocarbons are present in commercial quantities. Appraisal drilling would then test the size, quality, pressure, and flow rate of any discovery.

Several factors could reduce the amount that companies ultimately recover:

• Some geological prospects may contain no commercially useful hydrocarbons.
• Gas may be difficult or expensive to extract from the seabed.
• Production could require new platforms, pipelines, processing facilities, and export connections.
• Environmental rules, financing conditions, and security risks could add further costs.

The frequently cited $300 billion valuation also depends on assumptions. Future oil and gas prices, recoverable volumes, development expenses, operating costs, taxes, royalties, and the eventual revenue-sharing formula would all affect the final figure. A resource worth hundreds of billions at one price may produce far less public revenue after costs and contractual payments.

For now, the best description is estimated offshore potential. Cambodia and Thailand cannot turn that estimate into actual gas supplies or state income until they settle the OCA’s legal framework and allow companies to conduct exploration and appraisal drilling.

How a Border Dispute Became a 25-Year Energy Stalemate

The 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, known as MoU 44, was supposed to give Cambodia and Thailand a way to discuss their overlapping maritime claims while keeping offshore energy development on the table. Instead, the agreement linked two politically sensitive issues, territorial sovereignty and natural gas exploration, without producing a process that either government could sell at home.

That framework remained stalled for 25 years. Thailand formally terminated MoU 44 on May 5, 2026, although both governments said future discussions could continue under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS.

Why MoU 44 never delivered joint exploration

MoU 44 had two connected parts. First, Cambodia and Thailand would negotiate the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Thailand. Second, they could create a joint development arrangement for the Overlapping Claims Area, allowing both countries to explore and share revenue before reaching a final boundary settlement.

The structure offered a practical compromise. Boundary talks could continue without forcing either side to abandon its legal claim, while a separate agreement could allow companies to search for oil and gas. In theory, both governments could benefit from the resources even if the territorial question took years to resolve. The 2001 maritime framework was designed around that balance.

In practice, the two parts became difficult to separate. Thai critics feared that discussing joint development would make Cambodia’s maritime claim appear legitimate. Some also argued that negotiations could weaken Thailand’s position over Ko Kut, known as Koh Kood in Thailand, even though island sovereignty and maritime boundaries are separate legal questions.

Attempting to coordinate these overlapping claims is not unlike the necessity of an 811 call before you dig in residential construction. Just as that safety requirement prevents accidental damage to natural gas service infrastructure, clear legal boundaries are required to ensure that offshore exploration permits do not create lasting political or territorial damage. Without those safety protocols, the governments could not move forward.

That concern turned MoU 44 into a domestic political liability. Any Thai government that moved toward exploration risked accusations that it had traded away national territory for future gas revenue. Cambodian officials faced a similar problem if an arrangement appeared to accept Thailand’s preferred boundary.

The governments also failed to agree on the practical steps between a framework agreement and an operating project. They needed to settle issues such as:

• Which areas companies could survey first.
• Which authority would issue exploration permits.
• How production and revenue would be divided.
• How the two sides would handle taxes, environmental rules, and pipelines.
• Whether joint development could begin before the maritime boundary was settled.

Without agreement on those details, the OCA remained a legal and political holding area. Companies could not commit billions of dollars to exploration while permission, ownership, and revenue rights remained uncertain. After years without joint energy activity, Thailand’s National Security Council cited the lack of progress when it pushed to end the agreement.

The role of sovereignty and domestic politics

The dispute is about natural gas, but money has never been the only issue. Offshore drilling would generate revenue, improve energy supplies, and potentially reduce imports. Yet politicians must also answer a more sensitive question: who appears to control the seabed and the waters above it?

Public opposition made compromise harder. Thai nationalist groups often presented MoU 44 as a threat to territorial rights, while Cambodian political voices treated the OCA as part of a broader question of national sovereignty. In that climate, even technical negotiations over survey areas could become evidence of a secret concession.

Leadership changes added another obstacle. Each new government had to review the political cost of continuing the agreement, especially when opponents could portray cooperation as weakness. A proposal that seemed manageable to diplomats could become dangerous once it reached parliament, the media, or a nationalist campaign.

Past land-border tensions also damaged trust in the maritime talks. The recent Thailand-Cambodia border tensions reinforced public suspicion on both sides. Armed clashes in 2025 made cooperation more difficult, even though the fighting was not the same dispute as the offshore gas disagreement.

The central problem was political risk: leaders could share the future value of gas, but they could not easily share the credit for compromise.

Thailand’s 2026 decision to cancel MoU 44 removed the old framework, but it did not settle the claims. Cambodia expressed disappointment and agreed to continue using UNCLOS-based mechanisms. Both sides now face the same underlying choice: negotiate a boundary, design a new joint development system, or leave the gas underground while sovereignty concerns continue to dominate the discussion.

What Changed in 2026: Thailand Ends MoU 44, and Cambodia Seeks UN-Backed Talks

The long-running dispute entered a new phase in 2026. Thailand ended MoU 44 after years of stalled negotiations, while Cambodia used a compulsory conciliation process under UNCLOS to keep the maritime dispute on an international track.

The decision affects more than a legal document. It also changes the political route toward developing the Gulf of Thailand gas reserves. Much like the kinetic theory of gases, which describes the constant motion and collision of particles, the political dynamics between Bangkok and Phnom Penh have shifted into a state of high-intensity movement. However, neither the cancellation nor Cambodia’s UN-backed request settles the maritime boundary or gives either country immediate permission to drill.

Thailand’s reasons for abandoning the old framework

Thailand formally ended MoU 44 on May 5, 2026, after arguing that the agreement had produced little progress in 25 years. Bangkok said the two countries held only a limited number of negotiation sessions and failed to reach a practical arrangement for either boundary talks or joint offshore development.

Thai officials also described the framework as a source of continuing dispute, conflict, and mutual suspicion. From Bangkok’s perspective, MoU 44 tied maritime boundary negotiations to energy development without creating a workable timetable. The result was an agreement that kept the issue alive but left the estimated resources untouched.

Thailand now favors a process based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, commonly called UNCLOS. That approach would focus first on maritime rights and boundary questions under international law, rather than relying on the old framework’s proposed link between demarcation and joint development. Thailand’s decision to scrap MoU 44 has also drawn support from Thai nationalist groups that opposed concessions involving the country’s offshore claims.

Energy concerns add pressure to the debate. Thailand’s domestic natural gas production has declined, so the country has needed more imported gas to supply power plants and industry. As the kinetic energy of these negotiations shifts toward international law, the need to stabilize supply remains urgent. Higher import dependence can expose consumers and businesses to changes in global energy prices, while additional fuel costs can raise electricity prices.

That creates a difficult political balance for Bangkok. Developing the OCA could improve Thailand’s long-term access to natural gas, but any agreement with Cambodia could trigger criticism if voters believe it weakens Thai territorial rights. Ending MoU 44 responds to sovereignty concerns, yet it may also delay access to a resource that could reduce future import needs.

Ending MoU 44 changes the negotiating framework. It does not decide where the maritime boundary lies, and it does not automatically give Thailand or Cambodia ownership of the disputed gas.

Cambodia’s compulsory conciliation request

Cambodia submitted its formal notice on June 2, 2026, after bilateral discussions failed to produce meaningful progress. Phnom Penh turned to compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS because the old bilateral route had stalled and Thailand had already abandoned MoU 44.

Prime Minister Hun Manet and Energy Minister Keo Rottanak became key public figures in Cambodia’s push for action. Their message was direct: the dispute should not keep blocking energy development indefinitely, especially when both countries could benefit from a negotiated solution.

The Cambodian request does not ask a court or panel to award the gas to Cambodia. Instead, it starts a process intended to help the two governments address their competing maritime claims and return to structured negotiations. The procedure gives Phnom Penh an international forum after the bilateral framework stopped producing results.

Cambodia’s move also increases diplomatic pressure on Thailand. A dispute that once remained mainly between Bangkok and Phnom Penh now involves a process connected to the UN system and the UN secretary-general. That attention may encourage both governments to explain their legal positions more clearly and consider terms that could support a settlement.

Still, the process has firm limits. The conciliation commission’s recommendations will be nonbinding, and the report is expected to be sent to the UN secretary-general. The commission cannot force Thailand to accept Cambodia’s maritime claim, require a joint development agreement, or authorize drilling in the OCA.

The procedure may open a door, but both governments must still choose to walk through it. Without political acceptance in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, the gas reserves will remain beyond commercial development.

What the conciliation panel can and cannot do

The UNCLOS process is expected to begin with the appointment of conciliators from both countries. The conciliators and a chair are expected to be selected in July 2026, after which the commission would organize its work and review the legal and technical issues raised by the two sides.

The panel is expected to issue a report within about 12 months. Its work may include examining competing boundary arguments, identifying areas where the claims overlap, and proposing terms for renewed negotiations. It could also suggest a temporary arrangement for cooperation, although any such arrangement would require approval from both governments.

The panel can help by giving the dispute a clear timetable and an impartial setting. It may clarify which questions concern maritime delimitation, which involve energy development, and which require separate political decisions. Those distinctions matter because a joint gas project could follow a different path from a final boundary settlement.

However, conciliators cannot act as a court that awards the disputed gas. They cannot draw a binding boundary, grant exploration licenses, impose a revenue-sharing formula, or replace a treaty between Thailand and Cambodia.

The likely sequence is therefore:

1. Each country appoints its conciliators.
2. The commission selects a chair and reviews submissions from both governments.
3. The panel studies the legal, geographic, and energy issues.
4. It issues recommendations and sends its report to the UN secretary-general.
5. Thailand and Cambodia decide whether to accept and implement a workable settlement.

That final step carries the most weight. A panel can clarify choices and propose a compromise, but only the two governments can authorize exploration, approve production terms, and provide companies with the legal certainty needed to invest. Until they do, the OCA’s potential gas value remains an estimate beneath a disputed seabed.

What Joint Development Could Look Like if Cambodia and Thailand Reach a Deal

A settlement would not necessarily require Cambodia and Thailand to agree on the final maritime boundary first. Both governments could create a joint development zone that allows energy work to begin while each side preserves its legal position. That approach would turn the disputed area into a managed business project, rather than leaving the gas underground until the boundary question is fully resolved.

A shared development zone could unlock investment

Under a joint development model, Cambodia and Thailand would set aside the final boundary question for a defined period. They would then establish a shared management authority, approve exploration licenses, and divide income under a treaty or operating agreement. Neither government would have to treat cooperation as a surrender of its claim.

Similar arrangements have been used for disputed offshore resources. The structure can give one country’s energy agency a larger operating role, or require both governments to approve major decisions through a joint authority. A joint development zone treaty framework could also set out how licensing, taxes, costs, and public revenue would work before drilling begins.

For the Gulf of Thailand, such a deal could reduce the political risk that has kept the Overlapping Claims Area undeveloped. Companies would know which government can issue permits, which rules apply offshore, and how production income would reach each treasury. That clarity matters because an offshore gas project can remain exposed to political disputes for decades.

The arrangement could also encourage major energy companies to return to technical work. Their first steps would likely include updated seismic surveys, environmental studies, and exploration drilling. If the results confirmed commercial gas deposits, the countries could move toward platforms, subsea equipment, pipelines, and processing facilities.

However, a shared zone would not remove every risk. Investors would still demand stable contracts, protection from sudden cancellation, reliable maritime security, and access to impartial legal remedies. They would also need a clear route from exploration to production, including deadlines for approvals and rules for handling a commercial discovery.

A joint development zone can postpone the boundary decision, but it cannot postpone every commercial decision.

Cambodia and Thailand could strengthen confidence by publishing the agreement, creating a joint technical committee, and requiring regular public reports on revenue and environmental performance. Clear rules would help prevent each new election or leadership change from reopening the entire project.

The rules both countries would need to agree on

The hardest negotiations would probably involve the details behind the headline agreement. A workable treaty would need to answer several practical questions before companies commit serious capital:

• Who would own or control exploration and production licenses?
• Would one national agency manage the blocks, or would both countries approve each license?
• How would the governments divide gross revenue and profit after costs?
• Which country would collect taxes, royalties, and fees?
• Who would pay for seismic surveys, drilling, platforms, pipelines, and maintenance?
• Which pipeline routes would carry gas to markets in Cambodia, Thailand, or both?
• What percentage of equipment, services, and workers would come from each country?
• Which agency would monitor emissions, seabed damage, fishing impacts, and water quality?
• Who would pay for a spill, accident, damaged equipment, or injury?
• Who would fund platform removal and seabed restoration after production ends?
• How would the parties resolve disputes involving governments, contractors, or license holders?

The revenue formula would attract close attention. A 50-50 split may look politically fair, but it may not reflect differences in investment, infrastructure, operating responsibility, or the location of individual discoveries. The parties could instead share production according to the area of each country’s claim, divide profits after cost recovery, or use a sliding scale tied to project income.

Control of the licenses would be just as sensitive. Cambodia and Thailand could form a joint operating company, appoint an independent operator, or give one side the lead role while the other retains approval rights. Each option creates different risks. A joint operator may protect political balance but slow decisions, while a single operator may work faster but trigger concerns about unequal control.

Environmental and legal protections would need equal attention. The agreement should set standards for drilling, methane leaks, emergency response, fisheries protection, and data sharing. It should also identify a tribunal, arbitration process, or joint panel for disputes. Without those safeguards, a disagreement over one well could threaten the whole gas project.

Offshore gas development takes years and requires billions of dollars before production begins. Exploration may fail, appraisal can take several more years, and construction depends on financing, permits, equipment, and market demand. A short political agreement would therefore not solve an immediate fuel shortage. It would create the conditions for a long development process.

The benefits and risks for energy security

A successful project could improve energy security for both countries. Cambodia could gain a domestic gas source and reduce exposure to imported fuel. Thailand could slow the decline in domestic production and reduce some dependence on imported liquefied natural gas. Gas from the Gulf could also support power generation, factories, and regional pipeline connections.

By providing a reliable stream of fuel, any major natural gas provider involved in the project could help stabilize energy prices, potentially allowing utilities to offer a fixed rate plan for regional consumers. Long-term, this stability would benefit households that rely on various gas appliances for daily needs. Furthermore, the expansion of natural gas service across these borders would be supported by the development of shared regional pipeline networks.

Government revenue would provide another benefit. Payments from production could fund public services, infrastructure, or energy projects, although the final amount would depend on recoverable volumes, prices, costs, and the contract terms. Offshore development could also create work for local suppliers, engineers, construction firms, port operators, and maintenance companies.

Regional links could expand if the project included shared pipelines or power trading. Cambodia and Thailand might use part of the gas for domestic electricity and sell or transport the remainder through agreed networks. That cooperation would give both governments a reason to protect the project after production begins.

The risks remain substantial. Exploration may find less gas than current estimates suggest, or the reserves may be too expensive to produce. Construction costs could rise, global gas prices could fall, and delays could reduce expected public income. Corruption or weak oversight could also drain revenue and damage public support.

Environmental harm would create another serious liability. A spill, poorly managed platform, or methane leak could affect fisheries and coastal communities in both countries. Because the disputed area is shared, Cambodia and Thailand would need joint inspections and a common emergency response plan rather than separate systems that leave gaps.

Political conflict could return as well. A new government might challenge the revenue formula, question the license terms, or accuse the other side of gaining too much control. Internal opposition could delay approvals even after companies have invested in surveys and wells. The history of Thailand-Cambodia border conflict shows why security and public trust would matter to any offshore energy plan.

Untapped gas could support both economies, but it is not a guaranteed answer to near-term fuel or electricity problems. The reserves still require confirmation, financing, infrastructure, and years of construction. Until those steps are complete, Cambodia and Thailand would need to manage energy demand and imports with the resources already available.

What Happens Next for the Maritime Dispute and Gulf of Thailand Gas

The UNCLOS conciliation process may clarify the competing claims, but it will not make a gas project ready to drill. The commission’s recommendations are nonbinding, and Thailand and Cambodia still control the political decisions that follow.

The next phase will depend on whether both governments can separate national pride from practical energy planning. A settlement could reopen the door to exploration, while continued disagreement could leave the OCA frozen for years.

The most likely obstacles after the UN process

The hardest questions will remain political. Can each government present a compromise as a fair result at home? Any agreement must address Ko Kut, the maritime boundary, and the division of future revenue without making either side appear to surrender its territorial position.

Ko Kut will be especially sensitive in Thailand. Cambodia and Thailand may treat the island’s sovereignty and the wider maritime boundary as separate legal issues, but voters can connect them. A proposal that leaves the island question untouched could still face opposition if critics claim it affects Thailand’s territorial rights.

The boundary itself may prove difficult to draw. Maritime delimitation can involve competing baselines, coastal geography, and the legal effect of islands. Even a nonbinding recommendation from the conciliation commission may leave room for disagreement over how a line should pass through the Gulf.

Revenue sharing presents another test. Cambodia has supported joint development and previously proposed an equal split, while Thailand has wanted boundary questions addressed first. The final formula could cover production income, taxes, royalties, operating costs, and infrastructure. A simple 50-50 arrangement may not satisfy either side if the countries disagree over investment responsibilities or the size of their respective claims.

Practical risks would also slow the project:

• Security: Offshore workers, vessels, and installations would need protection if diplomatic or border tensions return.
• Environmental reviews: Governments would need studies covering fisheries, seabed disturbance, emissions, spill response, and decommissioning.
• Financing: Banks and energy companies would require stable licenses, predictable tax rules, and protection against political cancellation.
• Infrastructure: The project would need drilling equipment, platforms, pipelines, processing capacity, and connections to gas markets.
• Time: Exploration, appraisal, approvals, construction, and production could take many years.

The resource estimates remain uncertain until companies conduct modern seismic surveys and exploration wells. As recent reporting on the frozen offshore reserves makes clear, a large estimated value does not equal immediate public revenue or guaranteed commercial production.

A breakthrough remains possible, but so does another long pause. The UN process can organize the dispute and narrow the choices. It cannot force Thailand and Cambodia to accept a boundary, approve a joint development zone, or divide the gas income.

Why the dispute matters beyond Cambodia and Thailand

The Gulf of Thailand gas dispute connects to Southeast Asia’s wider energy market. Thailand already relies heavily on natural gas for electricity generation, while declining domestic output has increased pressure to secure additional supplies. Cambodia also needs dependable fuel for power generation and industrial growth.

If exploration confirms commercial deposits, new supplies could eventually help stabilize the price per therm for regional markets, though it will take years for production to reach consumers. If these energy projects yield significant government revenue, authorities could theoretically implement a rebate program, provide direct bill credits to households, or offer targeted energy bill assistance to support low-income families.

Those benefits would not arrive immediately. Offshore projects require years of technical work and large investments before they produce a single unit of gas. Import needs, electricity demand, gas prices, and project costs would still shape the final result. No current estimate can guarantee lower power bills or a fixed level of future production.

Gas development would also raise climate questions. Using natural gas generally produces fewer carbon dioxide emissions at combustion than coal, but it remains a fossil fuel. Methane leaks during production and transport can add to the climate impact of natural gas. Environmental reviews would need to examine emissions, marine habitats, fishing grounds, and the long-term removal of offshore equipment.

Regional investors would watch the dispute for signs of legal and political stability. A clear agreement could encourage energy companies, contractors, lenders, and infrastructure firms to study projects in the Gulf. Continued hostility could make investors more cautious about other cross-border ventures in Southeast Asia, especially where maritime claims and natural resources overlap.

Maritime disputes elsewhere in Asia show how resource interests can intensify security concerns. Coverage of energy reserves and disputed maritime claims illustrates why investors and neighboring governments pay attention to more than geology. They also assess patrol activity, diplomatic relations, legal protections, and the risk that a commercial project becomes part of a national security dispute.

For Cambodia and Thailand, cooperation could improve diplomatic ties and create shared interests after years of mistrust. A failed process could produce the opposite effect, with gas becoming another source of political friction. The wider region will watch whether both governments can build a stable arrangement for a resource that crosses a contested maritime space.

Conclusion

The Gulf of Thailand may contain around 12 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, but that figure remains an estimate rather than a proven, recoverable reserve. These gas molecules remain trapped deep underground not only by the physical constraints of intermolecular forces within the rock formations but also by the political deadlock between Phnom Penh and Bangkok. Furthermore, because reserve estimates are often cited at standard temperature and pressure to provide a consistent baseline, the actual commercial viability remains uncertain.

No drilling can begin until Cambodia and Thailand create a stable legal and political framework for the OCA, including clear licensing, revenue sharing, and environmental rules. Thailand’s May 2026 cancellation of MoU 44 ended the framework that had stalled for 25 years. Cambodia’s June 2026 request for UNCLOS conciliation opened a new path, but the commission’s report will be nonbinding.

Thailand has joined the UNCLOS process, yet both countries still need to accept a workable settlement. Joint development remains possible, especially as Thailand faces energy security and gas supply risks, but sovereignty concerns and weak trust could keep this vital natural gas resource underground. The strongest opportunity is also the clearest test: whether both governments can protect their legal claims while agreeing on practical rules for shared development.

FAQ

How much gas is estimated to be in the OCA?

Public estimates put the area’s potential at about 11 to 12 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Exploration drilling must confirm whether the gas is commercially recoverable under standard temperature and pressure conditions.

What is the OCA?

The Overlapping Claims Area is roughly 26,000 square kilometers of the Gulf of Thailand claimed by both Cambodia and Thailand.

Why did Thailand cancel MoU 44?

Thailand ended MoU 44 on May 5, 2026, after 25 years of stalled talks over maritime boundaries and joint energy development.

Can Cambodia start drilling without Thailand’s agreement?

No. Cambodia cannot legally begin joint-area drilling without an agreement that addresses Thailand’s competing claim and establishes operating rules for extracting natural gas.