BANGKOK – Tension that began near the Phu Pha Lek and Phlan Hin Paet Kon area has now spread into repeated clashes along several stretches of the Thai-Cambodian border. The situation is no longer a minor skirmish like many frontier disputes.
It has shifted into a more serious confrontation, driven by what many observers sense as “something unusual” behind Cambodia’s decision to push forward at such an unpredictable moment, and all fingers point to Cambodia’s former leader, Hun Sen.
Thailand has not been the side to start the conflict and has no clear policy that would welcome this level of tension. The fighting looks less like a simple argument over border markers or shifting map lines and more like a warning light from deep inside Phnom Penh.
International reports note that Thai soldiers were shot and wounded first in several locations. Only then did Thai forces respond to protect their troops and halt what looked like a calculated test of patience. In some areas, Thailand used air power to hit drone bases and heavy weapons depots on the Cambodian side of the disputed zone.
This showed a clear attempt to prevent Cambodia from gaining a long-term military edge in the area. When the timeline is laid out, nothing points to Thailand as the one that escalated the conflict. The pattern looks repeated and deliberate on the Cambodian side, too frequent and too similar to dismiss as random.
Foreign Media Questions Cambodia’s Motives
Foreign media have now begun to ask the key question quite openly. Why has Cambodia chosen this moment to push so hard that clashes break out all along the border? Traditional border strategy might explain part of the picture, but it does not fully match the urgency, the harsh tone, or the aggressive language used by Cambodian leaders right after the fighting started.
What stands out is that the clashes come at the same time as economic trouble at home and a power structure in transition. This is the real source of the “fragility” many analysts see.
That weakness does not come from outside pressure. It comes from inside Cambodia itself. This is a country ruled by Hun Sen for one of the longest periods in the region, now facing big questions after handing the prime minister’s post to his son, Hun Manet.
On paper, Hun Manet is the head of government, but in practice, he isn’t the centre of power. Senior figures in the army, the top civil service, and many of the old guard still show stronger loyalty to Hun Sen than to his son. In a crisis that demands fast decisions, it quickly becomes obvious who holds the real power.
A key clue to this layered power structure is the image of an online war room meeting that Hun Sen himself shared during the first nights of fighting. In the picture, Tea Banh and several veteran generals who have run the army with Hun Sen for decades are clearly seen.
Missing, however, is Hun Manet, the prime minister who should be the political leader in such a moment. Also absent is Tea Seiha, the younger defence minister chosen to lead the armed forces during the transition.
Hun Sen Pulling the Strings
The absence of both men turned that single image into an unplanned statement. It showed that, at the height of national tension, the decision-making power sat firmly back in the hands of the “father’s generation”.
When this image is set alongside Hun Sen’s later posts on Facebook, the pattern is even clearer. His language is fierce. He talks about using tactics to “crush the enemy’s living forces” and even mocks the enemy’s heads as “not made of iron”.
He does not speak like a retired figure behind the curtain. He speaks as the top military leader in charge. By issuing these threats himself, instead of leaving them to the prime minister or current cabinet, he underlines that the transfer of power in Cambodia is not as smooth as officials once claimed.
As long as this structure of power remains unsettled, the country stays fragile. That fragility tends to reveal itself in three clear ways. First, there is the use of external conflict as a tool to pull the internal system together. Second, leaders project an image of strength to hide their real weakness. Third, troop movements start to reflect the insecurity of those in charge, rather than the long-term interests of the state.
Cambodia’s Economy in Tatters
Cambodia’s economic slump only makes this fragility worse. Sihanoukville, which once boomed on Chinese investment, is now filled with empty buildings after Chinese capital left at speed. The grey industries that used to bring in large sums have been cracked down on, and the once-busy town has lost much of its energy.
Many workers are now unemployed. Household debt is rising fast. Export income grows slowly, while business liquidity has dropped sharply. Ordinary people feel the pressure more and more in their daily lives. As these economic problems grow, and with no clear sign of relief, the country’s leaders have a stronger reason to use an “external threat” as a backdrop.
Conflict can then help them pull legitimacy back to the centre and shore up a system that faces growing questions from its own citizens.
ASEAN media have reacted with care. Most have avoided saying outright that Cambodia started the clashes. However, the way they arrange facts in their reports quietly points in that direction. Cambodian actions appear first, followed by Thai responses.
Outlets in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia present the timeline in a way that lets readers easily see Thailand as the side that was attacked before it responded. Singaporean media add another layer of concern, warning that the fighting could harm ASEAN’s image as a stable region and shake investor confidence if things do not calm down soon.
Hun Sen’s Grip on Power
Some of the sharpest analyses have come from The Diplomat and Time. Both argue that the clashes are only a “symptom” of a deeper problem eating away at Cambodia. That problem is the uncertainty hanging over Hun Sen’s system after the transfer of formal power.
For decades, authority sat tightly within the grip of one man. The moment it was passed on, that grip loosened. Once that happened, gaps began to appear between the networks that had always operated under his command. In such a setting, external conflict becomes the quickest way to rebuild the “old order” and to convince the public that the leadership is still as strong as ever.
At the same time, Hun Manet’s absence from the war room image has set off questions across the region. Observers now wonder how much real stability he has in his role as prime minister and how far his authority reaches inside the state apparatus.
All these strands together mean the current border conflict is not only about lines on a map or a simple quarrel between neighbours. It is a moment when Cambodia’s internal problems spill across its frontier for everyone to see.
The tension carries meaning far beyond the sound of gunfire or the smoke of explosions. It is a sign of a political system fighting to keep its balance on shaky ground, choosing to use external clashes as part of a broader effort to hold on to power.
Thailand finds itself in a difficult position. It did not start the trouble, but it has to absorb the shock from instability in a neighbouring country. As long as Cambodia’s internal problems remain unresolved, Thailand’s border will need tighter and more patient watch.
Internal fragility has a habit of leaking outward. This time it has taken a very clear form, in the bursts of gunfire heard along Thailand’s own frontier.
Source: Manager Online
