TOKYO – Japan’s foreign policy as 2026 begins has a clear focus, easing tensions with China. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government is looking for ways to restart senior talks, including a possible meeting between Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Still, recent disputes and long-running friction make progress hard. Much of the current strain links back to Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan last November. Many observers say Japan needs steadier ties with China for trade and regional calm, but they also warn Beijing may not move quickly.
Late 2025 ended badly for China Japan relations. During a Diet session, Takaichi said a Chinese military move against Taiwan could become a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. She argued that this could allow Japan to use collective self-defence under the US Japan security alliance. Beijing sees Taiwan as a core issue and part of its territory, so it treated the remarks as interference.
The response came fast, official contacts slowed, and Chinese state media accused Japan of following US pressure. Now, Takaichi’s team has to rebuild trust while keeping its security stance intact.
Old History, New Pressure
Japan and China have a long shared past, with periods of trade and conflict. After the Second World War, business links grew quickly. By the early 2000s, China had become Japan’s largest trading partner. In recent years, trade has stayed above $300 billion a year, spanning areas such as Japanese semiconductors used in Chinese tech, and Chinese rare earth minerals used in Japanese car making.
Even so, politics keeps getting in the way. Disputes over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in China) and arguments over wartime history still flare up and damage ties.
Takaichi became prime minister in October 2025 and signalled a firmer approach. A conservative figure in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), she supports changes to Japan’s pacifist constitution and wants stronger defence capacity. Her Taiwan remarks were part of that wider message. Similar lines have come from past leaders, including Shinzo Abe, who warned in 2021 that a Taiwan crisis would affect Japan too.
This time, the moment mattered. US China rivalry is sharper, and China has stepped up drills around Taiwan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin called the comments “irresponsible” and said Japan was meddling in China’s internal affairs. Several planned cultural and business exchanges were then called off.
Since then, Tokyo has tried to lower the temperature. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa used a New Year message on 1 January 2026 to stress the need for “stable and constructive” ties with China as part of Japan’s Asia-Pacific approach.
In private, officials have worked on routes to a leader-level meeting, possibly alongside big gatherings such as the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro later in the year, or APEC in Peru. People familiar with the talks say Takaichi’s team is shaping a message that stays firm on security but offers cooperation on trade and climate issues.
Trade and Supply Chains Keep Pushing Both Sides
Japan’s economy is still feeling the after-effects of the global slowdown linked to the 2022 to 2023 energy crisis. A long period of conflict with China would add more pressure. Preliminary Ministry of Finance figures show Japan’s exports to China fell 5.2% in 2025, partly due to China’s retaliatory tariffs on some Japanese goods, including seafood and electronics.
Many in business still remember earlier shocks, like the 2012 rare earth restrictions that hit Japanese tech firms. Keidanren, the Japan Business Federation, has urged the government to keep channels open. Its chairman Masakazu Tokura said supply chains are closely linked and that better ties matter for both economies.
China also has reasons to keep business steady. The International Monetary Fund expects growth of about 4.5% in 2026, lower than the levels seen before the pandemic. Xi’s government wants stable investment, and Japan remains a major source. Large Japanese firms, including Toyota and Sony, still run sizeable operations in China.
Beijing’s decision to restart visa-free travel for Japanese tourists in December 2025 suggests it can separate trade from politics when it suits. Even so, analysts say Xi is unlikely to give ground on issues tied to sovereignty, especially Taiwan.
Takaichi also faces home pressures. An Asahi Shimbun poll in January 2026 put her approval rating at about 45%, and many supporters expect a tough line on threats. Any sign of backing down on Taiwan could upset conservatives, including people linked to Nippon Kaigi, a nationalist group she has been associated with.
Opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) argue for a calmer approach, warning that rising tension could pull Japan deeper into a US China standoff.
Taiwan at the Centre of the Security Strain
The Taiwan Strait remains one of the biggest flashpoints in East Asia. China’s faster military upgrades, including hypersonic weapons and carrier groups, have pushed Japan to strengthen its own defence.
Japan’s 2025 defence budget hit a record 6.2 trillion yen ($42 billion). It includes funding for long-range missiles that could strike enemy bases, a move Takaichi has supported as a deterrent.
Her November remarks referred to Article 9 of Japan’s constitution and the 2015 security laws, which allow limited collective self-defence if Japan’s survival is at risk.
Beijing sees Japan’s moves as part of a wider effort to box China in, pointing to the Quad (Japan, the US, Australia, India) and AUKUS. In a New Year speech on 31 December 2025, Xi repeated that China wants “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, but warned against “external interference”.
Analysts such as Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations say Xi’s third term has strengthened hard-line policies, with little reason to soften towards Japan while nationalist feeling runs high.
Other countries are watching closely. South Korea, another US ally, has backed Japan’s position on Taiwan in broad terms, while also pushing cooperation with China on issues like North Korea’s nuclear programme. ASEAN states, often caught between the US and China, keep calling for dialogue through groups such as the East Asia Summit.
A Takaichi Xi meeting could lower regional tension and may even help ease pressure in the South China Sea, where Japan’s sea lanes overlap with China’s claims.
Even with that, the road is steep. Past leader meetings, like Abe and Xi in 2018, took compromises on both sides. Japan softened some messaging on history, and China eased economic pressure. Today, with the US still keeping tariffs on China, Japan has less room to act alone. Yuki Tatsumi of the Stimson Center says Japan can’t ignore its alliance duties, and any easing of tension has to fit that reality.
A Practical Route Forward, with Few Illusions
There are openings in 2026. The 50th anniversary of normalised diplomatic ties arrives in 2027, and that gives both sides a reason to start groundwork now. Cooperation on global issues could provide easier first steps, including climate goals under the Paris Agreement and better planning for future health crises.
Japan has raised the idea of working together on green technology, including hydrogen fuel cells, which fits China’s net-zero target for 2060.
People-to-people links could help too. Programmes run by the Japan-China Friendship Association, including youth exchanges paused after Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks, could restart. Opinion in Japan remains split. A 2025 Cabinet Office survey found 62% had an unfavourable view of China, up from 55% in 2024, yet 78% still supported economic cooperation.
Some experts still expect Beijing to keep a hard line. They point to pressures inside China, including youth joblessness and problems in the property sector, which can push leaders to take a tougher stance abroad. Bonji Ohara of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation says continuity is likely. He adds that Japan may need to offer clear gestures, such as restating opposition to Taiwanese independence, while still protecting its main interests.
In Tokyo, expectations are measured. In a 3 January press briefing, Takaichi said she supports “dialogue based on mutual respect”. A meeting with Xi is not guaranteed, but Japan’s direction is clear. In an era of great power rivalry, a complete freeze with China is not realistic.
As 2026 moves on, the stakes go beyond the two capitals. A modest easing could help calm the wider region. A failure could add to instability across East Asia.
What Experts Expect Next for Japan and China
Academics and think tanks see both risk and room for steady progress. Akio Takahara of the University of Tokyo argues that trade ties will keep pulling both sides back to the table. He expects quiet work behind the scenes and small wins over time. From China, Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong has warned in an op-ed that Japan’s close alignment with the US feeds distrust in Beijing.
Some areas look more workable than others. Environmental projects, such as efforts to cut marine pollution in the East China Sea, could build trust. Joint work on over fishing and plastic waste would also speak to shared public concerns. Health cooperation after COVID remains another option, including proposals for a joint vaccine research centre.
Still, the Senkaku dispute hangs over everything. In 2025, Chinese coast guard activity near the islands pushed Japan to raise alerts. Japan’s move to place more missile units on islands near Okinawa shows resolve, but it also increases the risk of miscalculation.
The US also matters. Washington’s “integrated deterrence” approach depends on Japan’s support. The US administration in 2026 may encourage Tokyo to keep talking with Beijing, as long as it does not weaken the alliance.
Public feeling in China stays cautious, shaped in part by state media. On Weibo, posts often accuse Japan of returning to “militarism”, echoing the official tone from Beijing.
What a Thaw Could Mean for the Asia-Pacific
Better Japan China relations could steady supply chains that have been shaken by politics. Sectors like electric vehicles could gain, where Japanese battery know-how meets China’s scale in production. Investors watching US China decoupling would also welcome steps that reduce risk and support a more stable regional trade outlook.
On security, progress could support practical safeguards, such as wider use of hotlines between defence officials to avoid accidents at sea or in the air. Japan may also keep urging China to play a more constructive role in regional trade, including talks linked to the CPTPP.
Human rights issues remain a likely sticking point. Japan’s concerns over Xinjiang and Hong Kong irritate Beijing and could derail talks at any time. Takaichi’s government has to balance values-based messaging with the need for workable ties.
Tokyo’s winter may feel cold, and so do relations with Beijing, but small steps still matter. If leaders in both capitals show restraint and a sense of timing, 2026 could bring modest progress. If not, the stalemate could deepen, with wider costs for the region.
