NEW DELHI – The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, China (31 August to 1 September 2025), brought together leaders from China, India, Russia, and other member states. Public images showed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shaking hands and smiling.
Some saw this as a move toward easing the often-tense relationship between India and China and building a partnership between Russia, India, and China. Underneath the smiles, though, the summit did little to address the deeper issues dividing India and China. Long-standing mistrust, sharp competition, and unresolved border disputes remain at the heart of their rivalry.
This article outlines the ongoing friction between India and China, explains Putin’s efforts to form a trilateral partnership to resist American tariffs and sanctions, and looks at how the power gap between China and India affects their relationship.
India and China: A Difficult Relationship with No Simple Fix
Relations between India and China involve both cooperation and rivalry, but rivalry often takes the front seat. The two countries, the world’s most populous, are also two of Asia’s largest economies. They share a 2,100-mile border known as the Line of Actual Control, a source of decades-long conflict.
Deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley in June 2020, where 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers died, led to a frozen diplomatic relationship, military standoffs, and limited economic exchange for five years. The Tianjin summit happened after a modest improvement, with agreements for joint border patrols and direct flights, but key problems remain unresolved.
For India, solving the border dispute and reducing military forces at the Line of Actual Control come first. China believes border issues should not block progress in other areas, like trade. That core disagreement stood out at Tianjin.
President Xi focused on growing economic partnership, while Prime Minister Modi stressed the need for a peaceful border. A new working group was set up to help keep the peace along the border after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi, but without clear steps to reduce troops, big challenges remain.
India and China also compete for influence across Asia and globally. India’s closer ties with the United States, especially as part of the Quad (India, the US, Japan, and Australia), raise concerns in Beijing about a challenge to Chinese power in Asia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing presence in South Asia, including countries near India, worry New Delhi about being surrounded.
China’s close alliance with Pakistan further complicates the situation. During the brief India-Pakistan conflict in the summer of 2025, set off by an attack in Kashmir that killed 26 Indian tourists, China directly supported Pakistan’s army with targeting, surveillance, and electronic warfare. That incident highlighted how difficult it is for India and China to work together and deepened India’s view of China as a main rival.
The SCO Summit and Putin’s Push for Three-Way Partnership
The SCO summit offered Russia a chance to push for stronger ties among Russia, India, and China, especially to resist US trade pressure. President Trump’s administration imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian goods in August 2025, partly in response to India’s ongoing imports of Russian oil, disrupting US-India trade that had been solid for more than two decades.
US officials, like Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and trade adviser Peter Navarro, criticized India, giving Russia and China a moment to try to bring India closer.
President Putin, dealing with Western sanctions over the Ukraine conflict, worked to solidify his links with both China and India, hoping to support Russia’s political and economic interests. At the summit, he spoke about using joint strengths to form new trade connections, like drawing on China’s manufacturing base, India’s technology and service sectors, and Russia’s vast energy resources.
Modi, Putin, and Xi appeared united, sharing light moments for the cameras, but as commentator Manoj Kewalramani from the Takshashila Institution noted, these public displays sometimes cover up deeper disagreements.
For India, a three-way partnership fits its strategy of maintaining independence. India has refused to stop buying Russian oil (which meets 40 percent of its demand), showing a desire to keep its options open. Modi’s words at the summit, pointing to a long friendship with Russia, reflect a relationship nurtured over many years of cooperation on defence and energy.
India’s renewed links with Russia and careful dealings with China are practical steps, mainly to lessen the effect of US tariffs and keep its economy steady, rather than signs of full alignment.
Power Gaps and China’s Push for Regional Leadership
The difference in power between China and India heavily shapes their relationship. China’s economy, military strength, and international reach are significantly ahead of India’s, setting up an uneven relationship. China’s GDP is more than five times India’s, and its armed forces are modernizing rapidly, while India’s military, though growing, is still catching up and starting to rely less on Russian equipment.
China expects a leading role in Asian affairs and wants other countries, including India, to accept its leadership. India’s response is to push for a multipolar Asia, where power isn’t concentrated in one place.
At the Tianjin summit, Xi spoke of creating a new economic and security order for the Global South, clearly signalling China’s leadership ambitions. Proposals like an SCO development bank or an AI centre reflect this ambition. India, though, is not willing to fully support China-led projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and takes a careful approach to SCO plans that could increase China’s power.
India’s closer relationship with the US, following the Indo-Pacific strategy, looks to limit China’s influence in Asia. The US sees India as crucial in balancing China and supports India with military partnerships and technology-sharing.
Although US-India relations hit a snag over tariffs, India’s commitment to ties with Washington remains strong. By taking part in the Quad and other US-aligned groups, such as I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, and US), India shows a firm intent to balance against China’s ambitions.
Trade and the Economy
Business and trade issues add another layer to India and China’s uneasy relationship. China is India’s second-biggest trade partner, with significant bilateral trade, but India’s trade deficit with China hit a record $99.2 billion in 2025. India wants more access to Chinese markets and fairer trading terms, but China has not made big concessions. Restarting direct flights and relaxing visa rules help, but India is hesitant to open its markets further without narrowing the deficit.
At the SCO summit, China promised financial support to member states, including loans and aid, aiming to grow its regional sway. India’s cautious approach towards this kind of economic cooperation is shaped by concern that heavy involvement could leave it more dependent on its main rival, especially with China’s close support for Pakistan and ongoing infrastructure projects in India’s neighbours.
India’s involvement in the SCO, alongside its deepening bonds with the Quad and other Western-centred groups, shows its clear desire to keep all options open. New Delhi tries to keep good working relations with the US, Russia, and China, seeking the best outcome for itself as the global order changes.
The Tianjin summit was important in appearance, but it didn’t fix the underlying problems between India and China. According to experts like Sumit Ganguly at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, India’s careful dealings with China are more about buying time during a period of harsh US tariffs than any real turn away from partnership with the US.
India’s Resistance to China
US tariffs have pushed India to seek better ties with China, but major sticking points—the border, China’s support for Pakistan, and conflicting regional ambitions—keep the rivalry going. India’s refusal to play second fiddle to China, and its effort to deepen ties with the US and other partners mean the idea of a solid Russia-India-China grouping remains a remote prospect, as broader India-China rivalry still dominates.
The SCO summit in Tianjin highlighted an attempt by India and China, and Russia to show unity against US trade actions. Putin used the gathering to promote a closer partnership, but fundamental differences between India and China—driven by gaps in power, old territorial arguments, and different visions for Asia—kept real cooperation limited.
India’s resistance to China’s regional demands and its preference for strategic flexibility, especially with the US, underline lasting tensions between the two Asian giants. The summit may have created images of cordial relations, but deep divides guarantee that India and China will remain tough competitors, each making careful moves in a complex regional setting.
